A joint investigation into an accident at a go-kart racing
stadium, which resulted in a number of staff and customers
suffering from carbon monoxide toxicity, throws up some interesting
results
Go-kart racing was introduced to this country by American servicemen,
based in the UK during the Second World War, and has gradually expanded
in popularity since. In its early years, karting was expensive and
less accessible to the general public, but over the last 20 years
or so, indoor circuits that supply karts for hire have sprung up
in or near nearly every major town in the country, revolutionising
the sport.
But, last year an incident at a local go-karting stadium led to
a number of people suffering carbon monoxide intoxication, and a
joint investigation by the local authority and the district consultant
in communicable disease control was immediately launched.
On Saturday 3 November 2001, three separate parties (60 people
in total) attended karting sessions at an indoor stadium, for a
period of around four hours. The management at the stadium provided
the group with a fleet of 10 new propane-powered karts which had
not been driven together on the track before, and subsequently there
were problems with the gas karts stalling. The company, which had
been operating from the premises for over nine years, had previously
used petrol-powered karts.
Within two hours of the sessions commencing, eight members of the
group began to feel unwell with headache, lethargy, nausea and disorientation,
although the management team was not informed of any ill effects
to members of the public or staff until 4pm. At this time, a decision
was made to change back to the petrol-powered karts, and the new
propane-powered karts have not been used for public sessions since
then.
Following the incident, statements were obtained from all members
of staff on duty during the session. Six of the seven on duty experienced
headaches and one became dizzy and collapsed. However, only two
actually informed the duty manager.
Once the session had ended and the group dispersed, two hours later,
eight individuals were still experiencing symptoms and felt unwell.
They each attended the accident and emergency departments of their
local hospitals, between five to seven hours after leaving the stadium.
On examination they all had clinical signs consistent with carbon
monoxide (CO) toxicity. This was confirmed in four individuals who
were blood tested for carboxyhaemoglobin (COHb). The individuals
were discharged following observation and appropriate oxygen therapy.
Patient
CHOb (%)
Symptons
Smoker
Patient 1
6.9
Headache, lethargy
No
Patient 2
15
Headache, nausea, lethargy, sore eyes
Yes
Patient 3
7.7
Headache, nausea, lethargy
No
Patient 4
7.0
Headache
Yes
Patient 5
N/M
Headache, disorientation
Yes
Patient 6
N/M
Headache, nausea
Yes
Patient 7
N/M
Headache, nausea, dizziness,
muscle aching
Yes
Patient 8
N/M
Headache, dizziness
Yes
Table 1: Blood COHb levels of those individuals with symptons
Table 1 shows the blood COHb levels of those people that reported
symptoms. It is important to note that these concentrations were
at least five hours post exposure and that no medical treatment
had been given prior to this time. The half-life of CO when breathing
air is approximately five hours. Normal COHb levels due to endogenous
CO production are 0.4-0.7 per cent; in non-smokers in urban areas
this may be raised to 1-2 per cent as a result of environmental
exposure; smokers may have a COHb level of 5-6 per cent.
Carbon monoxide (CO) intoxication is a common form
of unintentional poisoning. CO is a colourless, odourless,
tasteless gas which combines reversibly with haemoglobin
(Hb) with an affinity 200-300 times greater than oxygen
to form carbohaemoglobin (COHb). The clinical features
of CO poisoning are diverse and the severity of poisoning
depends on the concentration of CO in the inspired air,
length of exposure and the general health of the exposed
person.1
Assuming a simple kinetic model, then it is reasonable to suggest
that the levels were approximately double at the cessation of exposure.
Patient 2, though a smoker, had a concentration of 15 per cent on
presentation (at least five hours post exposure), which would indicate
that his potential COHb might have been as high as 30 per cent during
exposure.
The signs, symptoms and prognosis of acute CO poisoning correlate
poorly with the degree of COHb measured on arrival at hospital.
Exposure to CO concentrations of 80-140 ppm for 1-2 hours can result
in blood COHb levels of 3-6 per cent; this concentration may be
associated with decreased exercise tolerance and, in persons who
are otherwise at risk, can precipitate angina pectoris and cardiac
arrhythmias.2
Clinical manifestations associated with CO concentrations of 105-205
ppm and COHb levels of 10-20 per cent include headache, nausea,
mild exertional dyspnoea, and mental impairment. Coma, convulsions,
and cardiorespiratory arrest may occur if COHb exceeds 60 per cent.
The incident in question occurred coincident with the use of new
propane-powered karts. These were taken out of use immediately,
but the actual CO concentration in the stadium at the time is unknown
because no measurements were taken. Subsequently, measurements were
taken at the same track during a race meeting involving petrol-powered
karts, and it was found that the CO concentrations were more than
double the occupational exposure standard (OES) of 30 ppm, in spite
of the fact that the karts were fitted with catalytic converters,
unlike the propane powered karts.
The local authority was instrumental in the subsequent investigation.
An improvement notice was initially served, to require a COSHH assessment
of exhaust fumes from the go-karts. Further to the results of this
COSHH assessment, four improvement notices were served in order
to:
improve the ventilation;
carry out CO monitoring of the employees;
keep records of air monitoring; and
provide information to employees and other people on the premises.
On the recommendations of the COSHH report, short-term measures
were put into effect, namely:
the fire and shutter doors were required to be open during
meetings;
the roof fans were to be kept running for half an hour after
racing finishes; and
the marshals rotated during eight-hour shifts.
These measures were checked during a number of visits to the premises
during the investigation. The company concerned has co-operated
throughout the investigation and is complying with the improvement
notices.
Since 1999, the chemical incident response service (London) has
been involved with two other similar incidents. The first involved
11 patients with COHb levels ranging from 12-20 per cent, following
a two-hour exposure. Symptoms included headache, nausea, and two
patients collapsed. Five were admitted overnight and discharged
well the next day. The second incident involved 10 employees from
a new indoor arena.
It appears that the number of reports of CO toxicity from go-karting
arenas may be increasing. It is also likely that small incidents
affecting only one or two individuals may have gone previously unreported.
The risk of such incidents in future could be much reduced if some
simple precautions are followed:
the concentrations of the exhaust gases, and in particular
CO, can be calculated from emission data from the engine suppliers,
ventilation data from the building, and operational data such
as the number of karts in use;
this investigation showed the importance of checking the actual
ventilation performance, and not merely assuming that the design
specification is being met. It should be checked on commissioning,
annually, and after any repair;
the CO concentration in the exhaust can be reduced from about
4.5 per cent to 1 per cent by fitting and maintaining catalytic
converters. These should be mandatory at all indoor tracks;
the CO concentration should be monitored with CO meters which
are of low cost; and
as business proprietors, managers of go-karting arenas have
a legal requirement to undertake a risk assessment on their premises.
It is especially important this is revised when any changes are
introduced, such as structural alterations to the arena or the
type or quantity of karts. Unfortunately, the published guidance
from the Health and Safety Executive is very poor in this area,
and the need for a COSHH assessment of exposure is buried in an
appendix.3