Do you understand evidence? David Lyons looks at the reasons
why prosecutions can fail due to evidential problems and offers
some advice for those involved in food safety investigations
and prosecutions
The Food Standards Agency in its Microbiological Foodborne Disease
Strategy (July 2001) estimated that 88 per cent of general outbreaks
of foodborne disease were associated with restaurants, hotels, pubs
or bars, and caterers. However, quite often when prosecutions follow,
they are for matters other than the sale of the suspect food, suggesting
that, for a variety of reasons, prosecutions for the sale of food
are not being attempted. It is possible that this is because proving
that implicated food failed to comply with food safety requirements
(Food Safety Act 1990, S8) is not as easy as proving a contravention
of the Food Premises (General Food Hygiene) Regulations 1995.
It is also arguable that the public expects that where a business
sells food that subsequently causes foodborne disease, it is prosecuted
for the sale of the food, not for the condition of the walls. That
said, gathering and presenting evidence to secure a conviction under
Section 8 of the Food Safety Act 1990 is difficult, and it is a
job not made any easier by the rules and laws relating to criminal
evidence.
Some appreciation of these rules and laws, and consideration of
them during outbreak investigations, can significantly improve the
chance of a prosecution concluding successfully. The enforcement
policy of many authorities includes a reference to the Guide for
Crown Prosecutors. This makes it a pre-requisite for potential prosecutions
to pass an evidential test before being proceeded with. Obviously,
a case containing defective evidence should not pass this hurdle.
Ultimately, the chances of a favourable outcome for the prosecuting
authority are enhanced when the case comes before a court. If a
case does not succeed, then it will fail on its merits (or lack
of them), rather than due to a technical defect in the evidence.
Even investigations which, on the face of it, yield up fairly compelling
evidence can unravel in all kinds of unforeseen ways because of
evidential problems. For example, in the case of R -v- Kashioulis,
[2001] All ER 139, a prosecution following over 150 linked cases
of Salmonella enteriditis pt4 concluded with "not guilty"
verdicts on all but one of the counts on the indictment. This included
acquittal on five counts alleging breaches of the Food Safety Act
1990, Section 8(1). The single guilty verdict related to a failure
to be registered under the Meat Products (Hygiene) Regulations 1994,
resulting in a 12-month conditional discharge which was subsequently
quashed on appeal - perhaps not the most favourable conclusion to
a two-day Crown Court hearing. While a number of factors combined
to defeat the Section 8(1) charges, in the final analysis the unreliability
of the microbiological evidence appeared to have proved fatal.1
Before considering the Kashioulis case in more depth, it is worth
considering what exactly "evidence" is.
It is said that courts can only deal in probabilities, not certainties2
and therefore, at its simplest, evidence is "any material which
tends to persuade the court of the truth or probability of some
fact asserted before it"3 or "something which may satisfy
an inquirer of a fact's existence".4
Evidence is assessed in terms of three distinct but inter-related
factors - relevance, admissibility and weight. Generally, evidence
which is relevant to an issue is admissible and anything that is
not sufficiently relevant is inadmissible. The vast body of the
law relating to evidence covers the exception to this general rule.
Evidence will be relevant (according to Lord Simon in DPP -v- Kilbourne5),
if it logically probative or disprobative of some matter which requires
proof. This means that "relevant evidence" is that which
proves a matter, or makes proof of it more or less probable. An
example of this may be the use of a till receipt to prove that food
has been sold. Thus, for an item to be admitted into evidence, it
must be relevant - and an item shown to be irrelevant will be excluded.Consequently,
an effective way to exclude evidence is to mount an argument that
shows it to be irrelevant.
There is no test that can be applied to determine if an item is
relevant or not, only logic, common sense and general experience
can be applied. Admission of evidence depends to a large degree
on "generalisations". Accordingly, evidence founded on
questionable, incongruous or illogical generalisations will be deemed
irrelevant. In preparing evidence, it is useful therefore to examine
the generalisations on which it is based and assess how satisfactory
they are and how readily they might be accepted by a "lay person"
without further explanation.
The party putting the evidence forward bears the burden of showing
that it is relevant. Expert evidence may be required to persuade
a court to accept the more debatable or exotic generalisations.
In the Kashioulis case, the generalisation that eating food contaminated
with salmonella caused salmonella food poisoning hit a stumbling
block when the question of infective dose was raised.
Although irrelevant evidence will always be excluded, it is not
axiomatic that all relevant evidence will be admitted. Evidence
may be inadmissible because it falls foul of some rule of law or
evidence, for example the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
or the rule against hearsay. Again the law is not clear-cut on the
issue. Whether and when a particular item is in or out, will depend
on the probative job it has to do. To discover the probative role
for an item requires an examination of what the party tendering
the evidence is actually seeking to prove and the relevance of the
item to that goal.
Once the relevance of the item to the objective has been determined,
an assessment of it can then be made in the light of the law and
the rules of evidence to decide on whether it is admissible or not.
Weight, although connected to relevance, is still distinctly separate
from it. The generalisations used to prove an item relevant also
operate to give it weight. Like relevance, the more questionable
the generalisation used to support the item the less likely it is
to be accepted as true and therefore the less weight will be attached
to it.
Evidence can also be excluded on a weight argument; the line of
reasoning being that an item's weight does not give it sufficient
probative value when set against the prejudicial effect of it. In
this sense, weight and relevance arguments are broadly similar.
As anyone who has observed criminal proceedings will be aware,
evidence also comes in various forms to prove the facts in issue
which are those facts that are material to the offence in question.
In Kashioulis, a significant fact in issue was whether the food
contaminated with salmonella was actually contaminated at the time
of sale.
First there is direct evidence, or evidence of a fact in issue
given by a witness who came to it by their own senses. It may also
be evidence from a document or item of real evidence produced before
the court. Circumstantial evidence are facts that are not in issue
as evidence of facts that are in issue. For example, the presence
of salmonella in food sampled after it has been sold as evidence
that the food in question was in fact contaminated at the time of
sale.
Circumstantial evidence can sometimes be thought of as a cable.
Properly strung together, the individual strands can combine to
support a case without the loss of any one being terminal. However,
the further away circumstantial evidence is from the ultimate fact,
the weaker it is and the more vulnerable it is to being used to
prove a contrary conclusion. Circumstantial evidence is sometimes
confused with collateral fact. Collateral facts are those that relate
to some supplementary matter which may influence the probability
of a fact in issue being accepted or not, for example, evidence
relating to a witness' bias. Real evidence is evidence that can
be presented for examination by the court, for example a piece of
equipment, or sample of food. Documentary evidence relates not only
to the contents of documents but also to other recordings, eg video
tapes and computer printouts (if it can be shown the computer was
working properly at the time). If an original document is produced,
this is considered to be primary or original evidence. But if its
contents are brought before a court in some other way, eg by someone
testifying as to its contents, then this is secondary evidence.
The testimony of a witness may therefore introduce several types
of evidence for the court's consideration. Testimony itself is statements
made by witnesses, generally on oath, in court. They may be oral
statements or more rarely written ones (affidavits).
An investigation into an infectious disease or food poisoning outbreak
generates evidence in many, if not all of the aforementioned categories
and deciding what to use can be problematic. The rules of evidence
do not require the greatest quantity of evidence to be produced;
in fact they require almost the opposite. The old common law rule
of "best evidence" required a prosecuting authority to
lay before the court the best evidence that could be presented.
So, producing an item for examination was preferable to a photograph
or a verbal description. In the past, evidence that was shown not
to be best evidence was excluded. Although the rule has fallen into
abeyance now, it is still a useful principle to bear in mind when
gathering evidence in contemplation of a prosecution. Today, it
is unlikely that an item would be excluded simply for falling foul
of the best evidence rule. However, if it is not best evidence it
opens a crack in the prosecution allowing a damaging, if not fatal
argument to be made to exclude an item on the basis of relevance
or weight. Depending on what facts a case is predicated, this may
ultimately lead to it, too, being irreparably damaged. Best evidence
was also one of the acknowledged justifications for courts refusing
to accept "hearsay" evidence. A failure to grasp and understand
the rules and issues surrounding hearsay evidence can strangle the
clearest cut cases at birth. The definitive statement on hearsay
was made by Lord Havers in R -v- Sharp6,
who stated that "an assertion, other than one made by a person
while giving oral evidence in the proceedings, is inadmissible of
any fact asserted". Undoubtedly, the problem for many people
is actually recognising hearsay when it is encountered. A useful
formula for its more successful identification is, first, to look
at any communication made outside the court, whether it is verbal
or written communication, or communication by conduct or gesture.
Second, consider the use it is being put to. If it is being used
to prove the truth of what was said or written, then it is hearsay.
If the purpose is to prove that a statement was made, then it is
not hearsay.7
For example, an officer taking a food history from someone who
has suffered food poisoning and then reading it out in court, is
not evidence that the person consumed the food in question. It is,
however, evidence that they had a conversation with the officer.
For the court to accept the person consumed the food, the person
would at least have to provide a signed written statement to that
effect and potentially give evidence under oath of the facts asserted.
As an area of law, hearsay is as complex as it is confusing and
therefore only a basic appreciation can be offered here. There are,
though, related issues also worth bearing mind when gathering and
presenting evidence in food poisoning investigations. The rule against
narrative (or rule against self-corroboration) provides that evidence
cannot be given of the fact that a witness has made previous statements
that are consistent with their testimony under oath. To do so might
lend their evidence artificial or inflated weight.
It is often argued that it is the complexity of the exceptions
to the rule on hearsay that give its reputation. Some exceptions
to the hearsay rule that may be relevant to a food poisoning investigation
include the fact that recording media, eg video tapes, that directly
record an incident are not caught by it. Nor are documents produced
by automatic recording machines, for example temperature logging
equipment. That said, where there has been some human input in the
system, for example the inputting of information into a computer,
the output will be inadmissible unless properly proved.8
Therefore, the taking of food histories for compiling into a statistical
analysis using a computer program will require by necessity that
the information is gathered in the form of a witness statement.
This may mean, in extreme circumstances, having those witnesses
available to be examined and cross-examined in court. This represents
a significant burden in the course of an investigation, but an essential
one if a successful prosecution is to follow. In certain circumstances
set out in the Criminal Justice act 1988, written hearsay may be
admissible if for a variety of reasons a witness cannot attend court.
This is a different issue to documentary evidence. In the course
of an outbreak investigation, through the exercise of powers conferred
under the Food Safety Act 1990, officers may accumulate a substantial
body of documentary evidence from suspect premises and their suppliers.
For the contents of a document to be admissible as evidence, then
either the original document must be produced or a copy authenticated
to the courts satisfaction must be produced.8
Proper authentication will usually mean the person who had control
of the document and who made the copy giving the evidence of that
fact, and the fact that it is a true copy of the original. Therefore,
where an officer takes into their possession a document, it is probably
prudent not to pass it on to others for copying.
In certain specified circumstances, oral testimony may be admitted
as evidence of the contents of a document. This is another exception
to the hearsay rule, and includes situations where the original
has been lost or destroyed, or where there is some other impossibility
or inconvenience, for example a document outside the jurisdiction.
Documents and reports etc, referred to by court acknowledged experts
are not covered by the provisions relating to documentary evidence.
Strictly speaking, the use of such material would constitute a breach
of the rule against hearsay, but a strict interpretation would constrain
experts from giving their opinion. Expert witnesses are generally
skilled in some particular discipline and they give evidence on
matters that are outside the court's experience. It is for the court
in each particular case to decide whom they will recognise as an
expert. Recognised experts are permitted to express an opinion on
the facts of a particular case provided those facts themselves have
been proved by admissible evidence.
In prosecutions under the Food Safety Act 1990, it is not unusual
for officers involved in food law enforcement to be recognised as
experts by the court. Certainly in Kashioulis, which serves as an
interesting case study, this was the case. As mentioned earlier,
it involved 150 linked cases of salmonella enteritidis pt4. All
the cases were linked to the consumption of chopped liver. A sample
taken from the delicatessen where the offending food was produced
yielded a positive result for the same species of salmonella. With
the outbreak several days old, a further sample of the chopped liver
was obtained from the freezer of a family who had been ill and it
too proved to be positive. Further positive samples of tuna salad,
and an egg and onion sandwich filling (also produced by the delicatessen)
were obtained from the fridge of another victim.
The conclusion looked clear - people had become ill by consuming
food contaminated with salmonella produced by the defendant. The
evidence being the 150 positive cases, the positive sample from
the delicatessen, the positive sample from the freezer and the positive
sample from the fridge. However, this was not as strong as it appeared
at first glance. Proper food histories were not taken; indeed it
appears that the idea of chopped liver being the source was already
firmly rooted and therefore only confirmation as to whether this
product was consumed or not was sought.
Given that salmonella enteritidis pt4 is the most common species
of salmonella in England, and is associated with many other foods,
the failure to take food histories and exclude other foods can be
seen as depriving this evidence of substantial weight. Further,
the presence of salmonella in the suspect food can only amount to
circumstantial evidence, and expert evidence would probably be needed
to convince a court of the link between its presence in the food
and the illnesses caused.
Undoubtedly a key plank of the prosecution was the presence of
the salmonella species in the food samples. However, this evidence
was seriously undermined when the defence was able to demonstrate
that the samples had not been taken in accordance with Approved
Code of Practice No.7 ("sampling for analysis or examination").
The failure was not trivial, as the defence was able to successfully
contest that the samples had been taken aseptically. This was done
by having the officer demonstrate their sampling technique in the
witness box. It did not help, either, that officers in cross-examination
were, apparently, unable to adequately explain the difference between
sterilisation and disinfection. Matters were further hampered by
the fact that the positive sample from the delicatessen was the
only one from 11 food samples and 23 environmental swabs. The information
on the negative samples, which the defence would have access to
by way of the provisions of the Criminal Procedures and Investigations
Act 1996, would serve to dilute the effect and weight of the positive
sample. All this provided ample opportunities for the defence experts
to discredit the results and call in to question the expertise of
the investigating officers. Thus, immediately calling into doubt
the validity of the sample results and introducing an alternative
and plausible explanation for the presence of the salmonella.
Furthermore, in respect of the samples obtained from the fridge
and freezer, the prosecution again seems to have assumed that there
was salmonella present before they were sampled, and therefore,
the salmonella was present at the time of sale. Caution would seem
to indicate that expert testimony should have been introduced to
offer an opinion on this point and to discount other potential explanations,
such as the food being cross-contaminated by something else in the
fridge, or by someone else who had access to the fridge. Ultimately,
these deficiencies opened the door for the defence experts to invite
in reasonable doubt and thus bring the matter to a conclusion that
favoured the defendant.
In the final analysis, the experts for the defence prevailed, but
they certainly had their way eased by the weaknesses in the prosecution's
evidence. That said, hindsight is a wonderful thing and while we
can be critical of the manner in which the prosecution was prepared,
we should be more concerned about learning from the experience to
prevent the same mistakes from recurring in future.
David Lyons,
Group Manager (Public Safety),
Middlesbrough Council
References
Dr Slim Dinsdale, "Microbiological results from foods"
New Law Journal, 26 May 2000.
Allen C, Practical guide to evidence, 1999.
Murphy P, Murphy on evidence (5th edition) 1995.
Tapper C, Cross and tapper on evidence (9th edition) 1999.
[1973] AC 729.
(1988) 86 Cr App R 274.
Subramaniam -v- Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965.
R -v- Coventry JJ ex parte Bullard (1992) 95 Cr App R 175.